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GOALS, QUOTAS, PREFERENCES AND SET ASIDES:
AN APPROPRIATE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATION?
PETER G. KILGORE*
"Affirmative action" has been described as a concept with no
single meaning.' Professor Thomas Nagel of New York University
made a distinction between "weak affirmative action" (advertising, ac-
tive recruitment, special training, etc.) and "strong affirmative action"
(preferences to various groups).' Mechanisms used to effectuate affir-
mative action such as set asides, quotas, preferences, and goals similar-
ly escape consistent or uniform meaning.' Indeed, both the broader
concept of "affirmative action" as well as these implementing tools
have received such varied application that the only conclusion one
can reach is that they mean different things to different people, rang-
ing from simple diligence in ensuring against discrimination to con-
scious favoritism of persons based on race, ethnic status or sex.'
Accordingly, at the threshold it is necessary to define the specific
affirmative action concept under examination here. As long as the
mechanism is drawn on the basis of race, ethnic status or sex, with
the objective being a result oriented approach rather than a nondis-
criminatory procedure, the concept will fall within the issue being ad-
dressed, irrespective of whether the term used is labeled "set aside,"
"goal," "preference," or "quota."'
* LL.M., Georgetown University; J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law;
B.S., University of Wisconsin; partner Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, Washington, D.C.,
representing employers in discrimination and labor related matters. Mr. Kilgore, a
lecturer in labor relations at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.,
was co-counsel for petitioner in the minority set aside case before the Supreme Court,
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). This article condenses a report submitted
in support of testimony given on affirmative action by Mr. Kilgore before the United
States Civil Rights Commission.
1. Sowell, Affirmative Action Reconsidered, 42 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 47,47-48
(1976).
2. Senate Committee Hears Views of Academics on Affirmative Action, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 117, at A-9 (June 18, 1981) (statement of Professor Thomas Nagel
before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm.).
3. See Sisneros, Revisiting Affirmative Action Case Law, 34 LAB. L.J. 350
(1983).
4. See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 184, at F-i (Sept. 23, 1981)(statement of Assis-
tant Attorney General Reynolds before the House Labor Subcommittee on Employ-
ment Opportunities).
5. Justice Powell commented that labels such as goals, quotas, or set asides
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EXAMPLES
To illustrate the major factors examined within this article,
several recent cases will be used. First, these cases will demonstrate
the mechanisms used in affirmative action, such as goals, quotas, or
preferences. The cases will also highlight the type of discrimination
each of these mechanisms intend to address-the perceived societal
or historical acts against certain classes. This article will then
demonstrate that the groups and persons receiving the benefits did
not actually suffer any identifiable harm and that the implementation
of these mechanisms injured -innocent third parties. Finally, through
the use of definitions and the concept of fairness, this article will
analyze the problems with the use of the current mechanisms of af-
firmative action and possible alternatives.
The first case concerns a matter, in which this writer was co-
counsel, involving preferences under Presidential Executive Order
11246, as amended.' In United States Department of Labor v. Priester
Construction Company,' a small construction contractor in Davenport,
Iowa entered into a federal contract covering work on a project for
a twenty-month period between 1975-77. The contract was found to
have incorporated a requirement to meet a 5-6% minority "goal" in
each construction craft utilized on all projects (both federal and non-
federal) during the twenty-month period in the covered geographical
area. This "goal" was derived from a so-called Hometown Plan for-
mulated several years earlier focusing on a much more industrialized
and correspondingly higher minority Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (Peoria, Illinois SMSA) than the area in which the contractor
was located (Davenport-Rock Island-Moline SMSA). Also, the Peoria,
Illinois SMSA was neither an area from which the company recruited
workers nor one where the federal contract in question and other pro-
jects subject to the goals were performed. Furthermore, the company's
workforce was unionized, resulting in all trade workers being hired
through a hiring hall arrangement from applicants provided by the
union.
Federal census statistics established that the goals far exceeded
minority availability. For example, the 5-6% goal in the categories
of brick masons and iron workers was imposed even though govern-
ment figures revealed that no minorities existed in those trades in
were nothing more than semantic distinctions. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 288-89 (1978).
6. 3 C.F.R. S 339 (1965).
7. 78-OFCCP-11 (1983).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss4/2
APPROPRIATE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
the Davenport-Rock Island-Moline SMSA. Similarly, in the carpenters'
trade the 5-6% figure applied notwithstanding government data indi-
cating only a 1.2/o minority availability. These figures were also re-
quired notwithstanding the fact the government had prescribed "goals"
for a project in this contractor's SMSA three years after the com-
pany's federal contract, less than half the figure imposed on Priester.
The trial judge accordingly found, which the government did not dis-
pute, that the "goals" were unrealistic.
Nevertheless, the 5-6% figures were reimposed in 1983 in the
categories the contractor failed to statistically obtain during the con-
tract period in order for the company to again bid on federal projects.
This result was ordered by the Department of Labor (DOL) even
though no discrimination had occured or was even charged in the case,
the Company had never been found to have discriminated in the past,
and in fact no charge of discrimination had ever been filed against
it in any local, state or federal agency or court since its inception.
Moreover, DOL reimposed these "goals" notwithstanding the fact that
during the contract period the company had a minority hiring rate
of 10%, which was almost double the goal if applied overall rather
than as to each craft; and had actually met or far exceeded the 5-6/o
minority goal for the alleged deficient time in each of the crafts after
completion of the federal contract even though the company was not
a federal contractor during this period; and had made substantial ef-
forts to implement the government's suggested affirmative action
paper work both during and after the contract.
The second example, Fullilove v. Klutznick, also involves a mat-
ter in which this writer co-represented a party. In 1977, Congress
enacted a statute9 authorizing billions of dollars in appropriation to state
and local governments for use in local public work projects in the con-
struction industry. A provision was inserted in the Act imposing a "set
aside" for minorities on these projects." Specifically, at least 10/o of
all articles, supplies and materials used in a funded project essentially
had to be procured from minority business enterprises (MBE). Con-
gress imposed these affirmative action quotas to supposedly eliminate
the effects of past societal discrimination resulting in a negligible
percentage of public contracts awarded to minority contractors.
The purpose in imposing the set aside was to counteract the
perceived effects of past and present discrimination generally thought
8. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
9. Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWEA) 5 102 et. seq., 42 U.S.C.
S 6701 et. seq. (1982).
10. 42 U.S.C. S 6705(f)(2) (1982).
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to have existed in the construction industry, to assure MBEs a certain
percentage of federally funded public work contracts, and to compen-
sate minorities bidding on contracts unddr the program at the time
of passage of the Act for the effects of social, educational or economic
disadvantage. However, no evidence existed of discrimination by Con-
gress in disbursement of federal contracting funds, by the state and
local government bodies implementing the disbursement, or by com-
panies to which contracts were granted. Several individual construction
companies as well as associations of construction contractors challenged
the enactment since they were being excluded from bidding on such
portions not because they had discriminated or because those MBEs
permitted to bid had been identifiable victims of actual discrimination,
but simply due to the fact of each business's ethnic or race identity.1"
In addition, illustrations abound as to affirmative action plans
(AAP) being implemented to supposedly statistically balance an
employer's workforce by race, ethnic status or sex. For example, in
1978 the Santa Clara County, California Transportation Agency im-
plemented a voluntary affirmative action plan establishing a "goal."
This goal was unlimited in duration and imposed to attain a workforce
percentage which approximated the distribution of women and minor-
ities in the county labor market."5 The AAP, which made no admis-
sion or mention of past discriminatory practices, was utilized as a basis
to promote a female employee over a more qualified male who had
been recommended for the position by the Agency's examiners.
In Philadelphia, the City's Board of Education adopted a quota
system in order to employ at each school's respective level (elemen-
tary, middle and high school) between 750/0 and 125% of the existing
proportion of black teachers employed city wide. This system, original-
ly imposed at the insistence in 1978 of HEW's Office of Civil Rights
(OCR) as a remedial device to desegregate school facilities,"5 was volun-
tarily reinstituted in 1982 even though OCR had informed the Board
that the faculties had been successfully integrated, and that no further
need existed to continue the 75/125% quota. The Board nevertheless
decided to continue the quota in order to maintain a faculty ratio
based on race. Teacher transfers were accordingly made thereafter
on this basis at the detriment of certain white instructors.
11. For a general discussion of MBE assistance programs, see Levinson, A
Study of Preferential Treatment: The Evolution of Minority Business Enterprise Assistawe
Programs 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 61 (1980).
12. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., No. 83-1532,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 239, at D-1 (9th Cir., Dec. 12, 1984).
13. Kromnick v. School District of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 896 (3rd Cir. 1984).
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In another case, the Jackson Teachers Association (a union) and
the Jackson, Michigan, Board of Education agreed in their collective
bargaining agreement that in the event layoff of teachers became
necessary, seniority would dictate "except that at no time [would]...
a greater percentage of minority personnel [be] laid off than the ...
percentage of minority personnel employed at . . . [the time of the]
lay off." The agreement also required that callbacks would be made
in order to "maintain the above minority balance."" (Emphasis added).
No finding of discrimination supporting the use of this set aside had
been made.
Another recent example concerned the City of South Bend, In-
diana. A preferential treatment system was established in hiring on
the basis of the existence of a statistical disparity between the percent-
age of minorities employed in certain job categories and their class
representation in the population of the City.'5 The plan, which was
invoked voluntarily even though the City's hiring procedures previous-
ly in use were not considered discriminatory, had two separate lists
to rank those minority and nonminority applicants achieving a certain
base score on hiring tests. From each list a recommendation of hire
was made. In 1980, a white male took the test and was ranked sec-
ond on the nonminority hiring list, but was not hired even though
several minority applicants with lower overall scores were hired.
Finally, in a case recently denied review by the Supreme Court,
the State of New York raised examination scores of minority appli-
cants in order to promote more minorities for the position of "Cor-
rection Captain" in the New York State prison correctional system."
The basis for the affirmative action measure was that a statistical
disparity existed between the promotion test's selection rate of
minorities and nonminorities. Specifically, the test in issue was given
to 275 candidates in 1982, 32 of which were minority. Results indicated
that 25% of the minorities passed the test, while non-minorities had
a 48% passing rate. Notwithstanding the test's objectivity, relation-
ship to job duties, and the lack of any discriminatory acts committed
by the employer, a conclusion was reached that the minority passage
rate of approximately 50% of the nonminority rate demonstrated
adverse impact under EEOC guidelines." A separate normalization
curve was therefore established for minorities, resulting in eight more
14. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, No. 82-1746, DAILY LAB. REP
(BNA), No. 215, at D-1 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S.
April 15, 1985) (No. 84-1340).
15. Janowiak v. City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
16. Bushey v. New York CSC, 105 S. Ct. 803 (1985).
17. 29 C.F.R. S 1607.4(D) (1984).
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minorities passing the test, increasing the scores of minorities who
had previously passed, and revising the highest minority score to
become the overall highest score of all candidates.
These cases show the various mechanisms used in affirmative
action cases and their heavy-handed effects. The problem with the
use of these mechanisms is better understood if one examines the
meaning of two often used and seldom understood terms; Discrimina-
tion and Fairness.
DEFINITIONS
Two basic definitional issues have been given little regard in set-
ting up preferential remedial programs. A brief definition of each of
these issues is given below, along with an explanation of the problems
inherent in a remedial program that overlooks these issues.
Discrimination
Absent some form of actual or historical discrimination, racial,
ethnic or sexual preferences implemented solely to achieve a statistical
balance constitutes discrimination for its own sake. 8 Presuming some
indicia of discrimination forms the background for the program, no
matter how remote or unconnected it may be with the particular em-
ployer involved, the question becomes what type of discrimination war-
rants a preferential treatment program. 9
The examples cited indicate that the entities implementing the
program were not found to have discriminated against any individual,
nor were the beneficiaries found to have been identifiable victims of
any acutal discrimination. The program was justified in each case
either because of a perceived concept of historical discrimination com-
mitted in the past against the chosen classes by society in general
and/or the fact that a racial or sexual statistical imbalance existed
between the entity's workforce and the population or labor market
survey.' For purposes of utilizing preferences, this is too broad a
definition.
18. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 529; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
19. The issue here is not what legally can be or is implemented under ex-
isting court interpretations, but what should be the standard for use of these type
of mechanisms.
20. This article is directed only at remedies imposed after a finding of some
form of discrimination has been determined. It does not address the separate question
whether statistical disparity alone is a justifiable basis to find discrimination. As to
this issue, compare, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983)(plan
with end goal of 50/50 staffing ratio was constitutional); Stetser v. Novack Investment
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 4 [1985], Art. 2
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Nonvictims of any specific identifiable discrimination committed
by an entity considering affirmative action should not benefit at the
expense of innocent third parties. If in fact a discriminatory practice
is identified, then appropriate measures such as an injunction can be
obtained to eliminate the practice. Make whole remedies, including
perhaps some form of preferential treatment, may be considered. How-
ever, unless there are identifiable victims such as, for example, ap-
plicants being denied hire or employees denied promotion due to race,
sex or ethnic status, the type of discrimination which triggers as a
remedy the possible use of goals, quotas, preferences or set asides
should not include societal or historical discrimination against classes
or statistical disparities between various groups.
Groups and Individuals
Depending on the statute, ordinance or program under which the
preferential treatment falls, various groups and individuals have been
either included or excluded from favored treatment. If, however, bene-
fits are to be expended, clear definitions of the beneficiaries need to
be made.
With respect to groups, under the Executive Order program
preferences are directed towards Blacks, Hispanics, Asian or Pacific
Islanders, American Indians or Alaskan Natives." Under the PWEA
set aside, Negroes, Spanish-speaking persons, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos and Aluets are included. Some of the AAPs referenced, on
the other hand, use some, but not all, terms similar to both programs.
It is readily apparent, however, that inclusion of groups has been given
little definitional consideration since the groups, while appearing at
first glance to be the same, use names which are neither always facial-
ly identical nor necessarily fully interchangeable. To illustrate, "Black"
is a term used both under the Executive Order Program and the AAPs
cited earlier. However, "Negroes" is used under the NBE provision.
Are the two terms identical? Similarly, are "Spanish-speaking" per-
sons, as used in the MBE set aside, identical to "Hispanics" as identi-
fied under the Executive Order program? Also, are "Orientals" coex-
tensive with "Asian or Pacific Islanders"? Are "American Indians"
or "Alaskan Natives" the same as "Indians, Eskimos or Aluets"?
Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981)(burden on employer to show affirmative action plan
is in response to a conspicious racial imbalance); Lehman v. Yellow Freight System,
Inc., (informal quota system held invalid as lacking procedural safeguards) 651 F.2d
520 (7th Cir. 1981); and EEOC Chief Cites Abuse of Racial Bias Criteia, Washington
Post, Dec. 4. 1984, at A-13 (statement of EEOC Chairman Thomas).
21. See 41 C.F.R. S 60-4.3(a) (1983).
22. 42 U.S.C. S 6705(f)(2) (1982).
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Even more complex problems arise in identifying subgroups
under each of these classes. For example, in the only program that
has apparently attempted to dilineate the definition of groups,2 "Black"
means any racial group of Africa (except North Africa); "Hispanic"
includes persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South
American origin or other Spanish culture; "Asian" or "Pacific
Islanders" refers to the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast
Asia, the Indian subcontinent or the Pacific Islands; and "American
Indian" or "Alaskan Native" signifies the original peoples of North
America who maintain identifiable tribal affiliations. These so-called
definitions, however, raise separate identification questions, such as
what African racial groups are "Black"? Does "other Spanish culture"
include persons from Spain or Portugal? How far "East" should one
look to define the scope of the subgroups for Asian or Pacific
Islanders? Indeed, what areas are included in the "Pacific Islands"?
Are all citizens of Hawaii and Alaska included? What is meant by
"identifiable tribal affiliations"? Does "Spanish-speaking" mean any
person who speaks Spanish, irrespective of his or her "hertiage"
(PWEA provisions)? Is a college language major of American parent-
age who speaks Spanish included? What is meant by the term "Indian"
(PWEA provision)? Doe this refer only to American Indians, or does
it also include American citizens from India?
In addition, classifying someone into (or excluding a person from)
minority groups necessitates a determination or an individual's racial
or ethnic make-up. The problem is, of course, that such classifications
under existing standards appear inherently ambiguous and
open-ended." For example, under the Executive Order 11246 program,
the focus, as indicated earlier, is on an individual's "origin." 5 The im-
mediate question, however, is what is meant by "origin"? Taken literal-
ly, it could be argued that all humans originate from the same source.
If "origin" means something different or to a lesser extent than the
same source, is it based on a certain blood percentage? If so, Justice
Stevens's comment in Fullilove is appropriate: "What percentage of
- .. blood ... is required for membership in the preferred class?"2
23. See 41 C.F.R. S 60-4.3(a) (1983); see also, EEO-1 Reports, 1 EMPLOY. PRAC.
(CCH) 1881, at 1322 (1981), submitted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. S§2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
24. See generally Nagan, Conflict of Laws: Group Discrimination and the
Freedom to Marry-A Policy Science Prologue to Human Rights Decisions, 21 How. L.J.
1, 30-34 (1978).
25. 41 C.F.R. S 60-4.3(a) (1983).
26. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 552 n. 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Must the candidate's parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and
so on, be considered to determine eligibility? If so, how far back must
one go, and, how can the race or ethnic status of relatives be traced?
Indeed, identifiers could find themselves in the dilemma where a
"Black" was deemed in one state to be a person with 1/8 or more
African blood while an American Indian was not a "colored" person
if he or she had only 1/16 or less of such blood.'
Identification of individuals may also be made under government
programs by using a three-fold standard:" appearance; whether he
or she professes to be a minority; or whether the community regards
the individual as belonging to a particular minority group. As to "ap-
pearance," one must first determine whether it pertains to color of
a person's skin, some other physical characteristic, or both. If skin
color is a guage, Caucasians have been judicially recognized to range
from white to olive brown." Yet, some persons who would likely be
acknowledged as members of minorities under the government's
.origin" test ("Asian") have nevertheless been determined "light
skinned" in appearance.' If "appearance" involves physical traits other
than skin color, what physical characteristics should be examined?
Would the factors vary depending upon whether the group is Black,
Hispanic, American Indian, Asian or Pacific Islanders? Should the
shape of a person's lip seam, eye fold, the size and shape of his or
her ears, the configuration of toes, the torso generally, teeth, jaws,
hair, or the concentration of pigments in certain anatomical positions
(such as hands and feet) be inspected?3
In addition, whether the individual "identifies with the minority
group" or is "regarded by the community" presents obvious problems.
For example, a self-labeling (or even employer-labeling) analysis surely
could defeat the purpose of classification. Factual questions will arise
as to whether a particular person can rightly claim minority status.
What mechanism is provided for determining such issues? There may
be a desire on the part of many persons to be recognized as minority
27. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1. 5 n. 4 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 187 n.6 (1964). Recently, such legal battles over racial designation con-
tinued. See Louisiana Sees No Shades of Gray in Women's Request, Washington Post,
May 21, 1983: Black Blood Measure. Washington Post, June 10, 1983 (corresponding
bill introduced in the Louisiana Legislature to repeal the law declaring a person to
be black if he or she has 1132d Black blood).
28. See EEO-1 Reports required under Title VII to the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). See also 41 C.F.R. S 60-4.3(a) (1983).
29. Trehan v. IBM Corp., 24 F.E.P. 443, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
30. Ali v. Nat'l Bank of Pakistan, 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
31. Green v. New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76, 79 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
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group members in order to receive preferred treatment or govern-
mental benefits or protections flowing from such a determination.'
Furthermore, if a person is "regarded in the community" as being
a minority, one must ask "regarded" by whom? What constitutes "the
community?" Is a poll required? Does "one person one vote" apply?
What happens when there is a split of opinion? How recently and
under what circumstances is the "criterion" satisfied?
It seems apparent that much difficulty exists in defining
characteristics by which persons are labeled as being of a particular
race or ethnic group. Indeed, a United Nations UNESCO study con-
cluded that the division of the human species into races is arbitrary
and invites abusive generalization, depending entirely upon the
classifier, circumstance and purpose.' However, if entities are to be
in the business of establishing preferential programs based on race
or ethnic status for persons other than actual identifiable victims,
studies need to be undertaken to eliminate, if possible, arbitrary iden-
tification determinations."
FAIRNESS
These case examples illustrate the fact that awards of specific
benefits are made to certain individuals while denied to others because
of race, ethnic status or sex. The detriment to others, however, is
summarily dismissed as the price nonminority individuals must pay
for the acts of our forebearers. For example, the Jackson Board of
Education set aside was justified as being fair to the white teachers
being displaced on the basis that when effectuating a limited and prop-
ery tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such
32. N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 200 (1975).
33. UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Race and Racial Prejudice, UNESCO
House, Paris, 18-26 Sept. 1967, U.N. Doc. SHC/CS/122I8 (1967).
34. While no conclusion is made on the success of attempting to define
characteristics identifiable for each race or ethnic group, the reader is directed to
certain revealing comments. For example, one scholar commented: "It is unlikely that
the species homo sapiens was ever divided into 'pure' races; but if it was, the fact
that members of the species are both cross-fertile and migratory unquestionably means
that virtually all of us would prove to be of mixed blood if the geneticists were to
discover an infallible means of tracing the racial [or ethnic] inheritance of individuals."
Bittker, The Case of the Checker Board Ordiance: An Experiment in Race Relations,
71 YALE L.J. 1387, 1421 (1962).
Studies utilizing U.S. Census Bureau surveys have also pointed out that a
substantial portion (one-half) of the American population cannot identify their own
ethnicity with any degree of certainty, presumably because of generations of inter-
mixtures. See Sowell, Myths About Minorities, 68 COMMENTARY 33 (Aug. 1979). See also
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a "sharing of the burden" is not impermissible. 5 The Philadelphia
School District Plan was deemed fair to foster racial balance because
it did not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of reassigned nonminority
teachers." The Santa Clara AAP was found permissible because the
excluded white happened to only be one person or at most, the non-
minorities directly harmed were low in numbers.37 Such justification
was similarly used for the MBE set aside in Fullilove.1
Fairness of these types of programs must also be evaluated from
two different perspectives. First, does justification exist for giving
preferences to the chosen beneficiaries. This question, in turn, breaks
down to whether justification exists for selecting certain groups and
individuals to receive these benefits. As to groups, it cannot be argued
that class-based discrmination against Blacks is part of America's
history. 9 However, that fact certainly cannot justify class-wide con-
clusions of discrimination against other groups currently preferred
under preferential programs. As pointed out in Fullilove0 : "How does
the legacy of slavery and history of discrimination against the descen-
dants of [Blacks] ... support a preference for Spanish-speaking citizens.
Estimates have been given that over 100 separately identifiable
ethnic groups exist in the United States, all of which could be con-
sidered "minority."'" Justice Powell acknowledged in Bakke that the
United States became a nation of minorities, each of which: "had to
struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the pre-
judices not of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed
of various minority groups of whom it was said . . . that a shared
characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups."'
Cape Verdeans Face Identity Problem in U.S., Washington Post, July 6, 1980, at A-i,
col. 1 (recounts experiences of Cape Verdean Americans who are descendants of white
Portuguese and black Africans, which "confound[ed] ... American social conditioning
and bureaucratic pigeon voters."). The difficulty in identification has also been
acknowledged in the judicial setting. See Aponte v. Nat'l Steel Service Center, 500
F. Supp. 198, 202 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n. 5 and 552 n. 30 (Stevens.
J., dissenting).
35. Wygant, No. 82-1746, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 215, at D-3.
36. Kromnick, 739 F.2d at 911.
37. Johnson, No. 83-1532, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 239. at D-4.
38. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
39. See Justice Marshall's separate opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387.
40. FulUilove, 448 U.S. at 552 n. 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. S. THERNSTROM, HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS Vi
(1980).
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292.
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This being so, one must ask "what basis exists to single out certain
groups for benefits at the exclusion of others"? In a pluralistic society,
such as the United States, a list of any groups which excludes some
seems to be inevitably underinclusive.
Furthermore, even if a basis for preferential treatment exists
as to a particular group4 3 benefits should not be extolled automatically
to all current individuals who possess the group's distinguishing racial
or ethnic characteristic if in fact no identifiable discrimination and
harm has actually occurred against each specific beneficiary of the
program. As stated in Fulilove":
In today's society, it constitutes far too gross an over-
simplication to assume that every single Negro, Spanish-
speaking citizen, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut . . .
currently suffers from the effects of past or present racial
discrimination. Since the [preferential treatment] ... must
be viewed as resting upon such an assumption, it necessarily
paints with too broad a brush. Except to make whole the
identified victims of . . . discrimination, the guarantee of
equal protection prohibits . . . taking detrimental action
against innocent people on the basis of the sins of others
of their own race.
The second different perspective from which "fairness" of
preferential programs must be examined concerns persons actually
hurt by giving benefits to others. As the examples indicate, remedies
for nonvictims are deemed acceptable because the burden imposed
on the class of innocent third parties is perceived as "necessary" even
though specific individuals are totally trammeled. Emphasis must be
made that justification for the detriment imposed is considered as to
the class of nonminorities rather than the individuals actually suffer-
ing the harm. 5 This perception, however, fails to acknowledge that
rights should be construed to inhere in individuals, not groups." Race,
gender or ethnic status is an improper basis to either reward or
penalize any person who has not suffered identifiable harm. Indeed,
43. If justification for group preferences is based on discrimination against
each class in the past, it seems that benefits given each class somehow should corres-
pond only to the magnitude of discrimination each class suffered in comparison with
other groups. Otherwise, both under and overinclusive remedies would seemingly result.
44. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 530 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45. Compare Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland No. 83-3091, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 21, at E-3 (6th Cir. 1985).
46. See Ciil Rights Commission Praises Supreme Court's Stotts Ruling, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 125, at A-4 (July 13, 1984).
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preferential treatment accorded to nonvictims, or even to actual vic-
tims beyond measures necessary to make them whole, deprive cer-
tain innocent individuals in the examples cited their rightful place.
The issue in using preferential programs should not be clouded by
our resolve against historical patterns of discrimination, but must be
examined as to what remedy is appropriate to improve the status of
disadvantage groups. Should an employer or any other entity give
benefits to nonvictims at the expense of innocent third parties because
of a perceived guilt of our forefathers?
Where discrimination is found to currently exist in any entity,
proper judicial channels are available to eliminate its continuation
under the civil rights acts, various government programs, constitu-
tion or state laws. However, in remedying the damage caused by any
such historical or societal acts, one of the leading advocates of civil
rights in this century properly noted"1 : "The relief [for findings of
discrimination against an entity calls for] an injunction against future
acts or practices of discrimination .... [However] affirmative relief,
such as hiring, reinstatement . . . or back pay . . . for anyone [not
an actual victim should be] forbidden .. "
Preferential programs may be warranted as a remedial device,
but only in the narrowness of circumstances. When specific persons
are identified as having suffered actual harm because of an entity's
discrimination, all forms of relief, including set asides, quotas, goals
or preferences should be considered to "make whole" such victims.
Even then, however, a balancing must occur as to the burden imposed
on innocent third parties against alternative, less harmful means to
"make whole." This concept, although admittedly in a more narrow
context, was recently articulated by the Supreme Court and should
constitute the standard for use of preferential programs48:
If individual members of the [preferred] . . class
demonstrate that they have been actual victims of the
discriminatory practice [of a particular entity], they may be
awarded [reparation for actual harm suffered] ... [Hlowever,
• . . mere membership in the . . . class [should be] insuffi-
cient to warrant ... award; each individual must prove that
the discriminatory practice had an impact . . . even when
an individual shows that this discriminatory practice has
had an impact . .. automatic [entitlement does not follow,
for a]... balance [of] the equities in[volved must occur] ....
47. 100 CONG. REC. 6.549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
48. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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EFFECT OF SET ASIDES
The effect of preferential treatment is not a settled question.
Certain studies suggest that the implementation of preferential pro-
grams such as exemplified here increases the percentage of minorities
and females in the workforce or in the award of contracts. For exam-
ple, under the PWEA set aside, progress reports during the implemen-
tation of the program indicated 16-17% of the funds expended went
to MBEs.4' Under the Executive Order Program, a study by the
University of California" indicated a strong increase in blacks and
females.
Argument also exists, however, that such programs have either
little substantial affect or that they demean the beneficiaries for whom
preferences are sought.5 ' For example, studies have indicated that Title
VII class action litigation against actual discriminators has a greater
impact than affirmative action goals for increasing minority levels. 2
Set asides have also been looked upon as the granting of special
benefits to groups that are somehow less qualified53, or that these
programs imply that the persons benefitted cannot compete success-
fully in the open marketplace.' Dr. John Bunzel of the Hoover Insti-
tute remarked that imposition of set asides and quotas will fail to
improve the economic and racial position of the disadvantaged, and
in fact will damage minorities' motivation, self-respect, and capacity."
Professor William Van Alstyne of Duke University indicated racial
set asides stamp their recipients with a badge of inferiority, and put
pressure on minority groups to subdivide themselves against each
other. Numerous problems such as nonminority "front" companies
have also been found to dilute the objectives of such programs.
49. See Department of Commerce, Local Public Works Program, Interim Report:
Fostering the Development and Expansion of Minority Firms in Construction and Related
Industries (Sept. 1978).
50. Leonard, The Impact of Affurmative Action (The Crump Study), DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 113, at A-8 (June 10, 1983).
51. See, e.g., Small/Minority Business: OFPP Says Agencies' Automatic Doubl-
ing of MBE Goals Ineffective, FED CONTRACTS REP. (BNA) No. 886, at A-19 (June 15,1981).
52. See supra note 50.
53. See United Jewish Organiztion v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977).
54. Excerpts From Final Report of EEOC Prepared By Transition Team of
Reagan Administration, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 15. at E-2 (Jan. 23, 1981).
55. See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 117, at A-9, A-10 (June 18, 1981).
56. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 85, at A-7 (May 4, 1981).
57. E.g., Nearly One-Fourth of MBE-WBE Highway Contractors Decertified in
New Jersey, 30 CONSTR. LAB. REP. (BNA) 1110 (Dec. 5, 1984).
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Whichever side presents the stronger case, however, is beside
the point. Quotas, preferences, goals and set asides are opposed by
most Americans, including Blacks. 8 History cannot be rewritten. To
perceive that somehow the use of preferential programs will balance
this society or cure the perceived effects of historical discrimination
in employment, contracting, education, etc., defies reality. Our objec-
tive should be equal treatment, not equal and unobtainable results.
ALTERNATIVES
Because set asides are an improper social mechanism to improve
the status of disadvantaged groups, does not mean other alternatives
are unavailable. The United States Commission on Civil Rights in-
dicated affirmative action techniques such as training, education,
counseling, recruitment programs certainly warrant encouragement.5 9
In this regard, several concepts should be explored.
Joint Ventures
Programs could be established which encourage companies to
enter into joint ventures with individuals who own minority, female
or any disadvantaged business enterprise by providing tax incentives.
The joint venture could be on a project basis or for a fixed period
of time (hours, months, etc). The advantage of the joint venture is
that this would enable the business enterprise entrepreneur to work
with the company over a period of time in a "partnership-type ar-
rangement." This arrangement would assist individuals in the develop-
ment of general management skills, and specific expertise in such areas
as filance, labor, bidding procedures, marketing, and bonding.
Joint ventures also allow for flexibility. The level of participa-
tion in the joint venture could hinge on the disadvantaged individual's
experience, with participation on a 90/10, 80/20 or greater basis. If
the joint venture extended over a substantial period of time, a greater
share of the joint venture could be given to the disadvantaged in-
dividual as he or she acquired more experience. This concept would
serve to improve the skills of these businesses and thereby provide
greater guarantees that they will be able to compete without depriv-
ing nonminorities of opportunities to competitively bid on a portion
of any project or grant.
58. See, e.g., DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 194, at A-7 (Oct. 5, 1984){statement of
U.S. Civil Rights Commission Staff Director Chavez).
59. See Policy Statement of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, DAILY LAB.
RP. (BNA) No. 12, at A-3 (Jan. 14, 1984). See also DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 189, at A-3
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Technical Services
Technical services could include assistance in: taking steps to
become prequalified or licensed as a contractor, subcontractor, vendor,
supplier or whatever requirements exist in a particular industry;
understanding bonding requirements; understanding how to obtain
loans and working capital, or any other matter related to a particular
industry. These services could take the form of either a toll-free
number which would furnish information on bidding solicitation and
answer questions or in-field assistance by support personnel who would
visit minority, female or disadvantaged business owners at their place
of business to provide technical services. Another support service
would be to compile a directory of interested MBEs, WBEs or other
disadvantaged enterprises such as used by the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment's Minority Business Development Agency, which formulated a
National Automated Minority Business Source list for use by com-
panies to do business with MBE firms.'
Financial Assistance
A problem in starting any business or to make it grow is obtain-
ing working capital. Financial assistance programs, either individually
or collectively with other programs, could greatly assist in increasing
the number of viable minority, female and disadvantaged business
enterprises. While numerous types of financial assistance is con-
ceivable, one program could be to direct loans similar to those which
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare provided to students
at a reduced rate and payable at a later period of time." Such a pro-
gram applied to individuals owning or operating business enterprises
could furnish needed capital at an extremely low rate which could
be payable at a later time on a sliding scale of interest, thereby not
placing any undue burden on the enterprise just as it is becoming
viable.
Educational Training
Many individuals who are socially and economically disadvantaged
would perhaps like to get into a business of their own or a particular
(Sept. 28, 1984) (statement of G. Banks, a psychologist with Human Technology. Inc.);
and Analysis of E.O. 1126 Contract Compliance Programs by Staff of Senate Labor &
Human Resources Committee, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 82, at A-2 (Apr. 28, 1982).
60. Small Minority Business: OFPP Says Automatic Doubling of MBE Goals
Ineffective, FED. CONTRACTS REP. (BNA) No. 875, at C-2 (Mar. 30, 1981).
61. Title IV, Part B, Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. SS 1071-1086
(1976 & Supp. 1984).
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field but cannot afford the money to abandon current employment
to attend school and acquire the necessary skills. Thus, there exists
a gap that could be filled by a program similar to that used for
veterans to allow certain direct educational grants to get them into
the main stream to make up for lost time. Additionally, money could
be channeled to the universities to establish work-study programs
which would assist individuals who own or operate disadvantaged
business enterprises to acquire skill needed to effectively operate a
business by learning and applying these skills in a realistic business
situation. Indeed, more programs need to be explored similar to what
the DOL entered into last year under the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) with the National Puerto Rican Forum for programs
designed to help Hispanic workers, including courses aimed at develop-
ing job. search skill, etc. 2 JTPA has also been used to teach groups
business training courses and give technical assistance for starting
businesses."
Assistance Through Trained Workers
One of the greatest sources of training for persons entering into
the business market for the first time is to learn from the experience
of those already there or who have been there. A type of program
which could be established with minimal financial assistance from the
government would be a "pool" of trained individuals, e.g. business
executives, familiar with the particular industry, who would be loaned
to minority, female or disadvantaged business enterprises. Another
sourci" of expertise would be the utilization of retired personnel who
would be willing to share with such "would be" entrepreneurs the
knowledge and experience gained from their prior employment.
Another method of learning from experienced individuals would be
to establish an internship program to allow individuals who own or
wish to own enterprises or to learn particular skills to spend time
(six months/one year) with a "host" company. The purpose of the in-
ternship would be to allow the intern to acquire experience in business
administration, management, estimation, bidding process, bonding,
banking, particular job functions or whatever would be applicable
depending on the industry.
62. Labor Department Enters Contract to Assist Hispanic Workers, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 18, at A-5 (Jan. 27, 1984).
63. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 73, at A-4 (Apr. 16, 1984). Indeed the SBA
reported that small firms provide greater employment opportunity for female and
minority workers. See Job Creation in Economic Recovery Led by Small Business, SBA
Reports, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 57, at B-3 (Mar. 23, 1984).
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Bonding
A major difficulty of any enterprise entering into the market
is obtaining bonding. Many projects, particularly those involving the
government, require companies to post bonds covering the comple-
tion of work and payments to their employees for work performed.
For an existing viable company, this may not present any real prob-
lem. However, where a person is entering the market, the possibility
that many bonding companies will not provide a bond at any price
or are only willing to provide a bond at a very high cost must be
faced. Thus, in a competitive bid situation, a MBE, WBE or other
disadvantaged group might not be able to compete because he or she
cannot obtain a bond. Greater assistance could be provided through
government assistance programs to such enterprises to ensure that
there exists a source of bonds at a fair rate.
CONCLUSION
Where an entity has discriminated, appropriate action should be
taken to eliminate the discriminatory acts and make whole those vic-
tims who have suffered actual harm. In addition, affirmative action
in the form of training, education, joint venture programs, bonding,
etc. should be encouraged and explored in order to assist all disad-
vantaged groups, including minorities and females. However, set
asides, quotas, goals or preferences should not be used to remedy the
effects of either actual discrimination to nonvictims or the broader
concept of historical discrimination solely due to such persons' race,
sex or ethnic status.
We should not, as Justice Blackmun suggested, use race "in order
to get beyond racism."" Indeed, such a concept is as onerous in
historical perspective as "separate but equal," and certainly should
be deemed alien to our constitutional objective of equal protection
for all citizens. One gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now."'
Let our resolve be to eliminate racial, ethnic and sexual barriers, not
create them in an attempt to rewrite history by parceling out benefits
to nonvictims at the expense of innocent third parties.
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
65. See Van Aistyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court, and the Con-
stitution, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 775, 809 (1979).
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